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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930372-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a case arising from the justice court; jurisdiction 
exists in the Utah Court of Appeals to the extent that the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was 
raised in the justice Court. See Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 26(13(a); Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 835 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989, afffd, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert, denied 498 U.S. 
841, 11 S.Ct. 12, 112 L.Ed.2d (1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62 (as amended) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case, viewing the 
facts presented in a light most favorable to Appellee, the State 
of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant/Appellant appeals from a trial court decision 
that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62 (as amended) is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case. This action 
originates out of the Logan City Municipal Court. A de novo 
appeal was taken to the First Circuit Court, Cache County. The 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals followed. 
THE FACTS 
On November 7, 1992, at about 2:20 in the afternoon, the 
Appellant/Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the "Defendant"), 
David Craig Carlsen, was issued a citation for "Following to 
Close" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62. This statute 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
41-6-62. following another vehicle - Safe 
distance - Caravan or motorcade -
Exception for funeral procession. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not 
follow another vehicle more closely than is 
reasonable and prudent, having regard for the 
speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon 
and the condition of the highway. 
A formal information was filed with the Logan City Municipal 
Court on December 1, 1992. On December 7, 1992, the Defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss the case; this motion was based upon an 
assertion that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62 is unconstitutionally 
vague, both on its face and as applied in the case. The Motion 
did not articulate any factual basis or analysis in support of 
these general assertions. On December 11, 1992, the Municipal 
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Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the 
motion was denied. That same day, the Defendant was tried under 
the aforementioned statute, and was found guilty. He waived his 
right to be sentenced in not less than two days, nor more than 
thirty days and was sentenced by the Court.1 A de novo appeal to 
the Circuit Court followed. 
The Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss in the Circuit 
Court and again, the motion was denied. The Defendant's case was 
tried before a jury. At trial, the state produced the testimony 
of Russ Roper, the officer who issued the subject citation. The 
officer testified that on the day in question, he was on routine 
patrol in the vicinity of 300 North and 100 East in Logan, Utah. 
The officer made a U-turn and proceeded south on 100 East. At 
that time, the Defendant's car was two cars ahead of Officer 
Roper's patrol car. The Defendant turned west on Center Street; 
Officer Roper likewise turned west on Center Street and within 
seconds, the Defendant pulled his car to the curb. Officer Roper 
drove by the Defendant's vehicle. 
Immediately after Officer Roper passed the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Defendant pulled his car out and began to follow the 
officer as the officer turned right on Main Street. According to 
Officer Roper, the Defendant's vehicle came within one foot of 
the officer's patrol car as the two proceeded north on Main 
Street at approximately 25 miles per hour. Eventually, the 
2The defendant was fined $37.04 plus a surcharge of $12.96, 
and was sentenced to 4 days in jail. The jail term was to be 
suspended upon payment of the fine. 
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Defendant turned off of Main Street and stopped his vehicle. 
Officer Roper pulled up behind the Defendant and issued the 
subject citation. 
At the Defendant's trials, Officer Roper testified that 
based upon his experience and training as a traffic patrol 
officer, it was unreasonable and imprudent for the Defendant to 
drive within a foot of the officer's patrol car while the two 
were traveling at a speed of 25 miles per hour on Main Street in 
Logan. The officer testified that following at such a close 
distance would cause the Defendant's vehicle to collide with the 
officer's vehicle if Officer Roper needed to stop. 
In two separate trials, similar testimony was produced for 
the fact finder by the State. The Defendant asserted in his 
defense that Officer Roper was harassing the Defendant and was 
"stalking" him. Ironically, the Defendant made this claim even 
though the Defendant elected to follow the officer down Center 
Street and then on Main Street, at a very close distance given 
the speeds of the two automobiles. After the bench trial in the 
Municipal Court -- and subsequent to the de novo jury trial in 
the Circuit Court, the finder of fact elected to accept the 
testimony of the officer over that proffered by the Defendant, 
and in both trials, guilty verdicts were returned. 
This appeal followed. Once again, the defendant asserts 
that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62 is unconstitutionally vague. 
The Defendant also raises a new separation of powers issue for 
the first time in this appeal. 
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ANALYSIS 
WHETHER UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 41-6-62 (AS 
AMENDED) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS 
APPLIED IN THIS CASE, VIEWING THE FACTS IN A 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLEE, THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
A. Presumptions 
As a preliminary matter, the Defendant has not provided the 
Court of Appeals with a trial transcript, and generally, in the 
absence of a trial transcript, the appellate court should presume 
that the evidence supports the fact-finderTs verdict, and that 
the trial judge's rulings were correct. State v. Linden, 761 
P.2d 1386, 1388, (Utah 1988). Further, because legislative 
enactments are presumed to be constitutional, those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional carry the burden of 
demonstrating its unconstitutionality. Utah Associated Mun. 
Power Sys. v. Public Serv. CommTn, 789 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
Finally, in reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1993); State v. Andrews, 8432 P.2d 1027, 1030 
(Utah 1992); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992). 
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B. Void-for-vagueness Doctrine 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or 
ordinance define an "offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[i] t is a basic 
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness 
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) . The test to be applied in 
deciding whether a statute is void for vagueness is an objective 
test: A statute will be held void for vagueness if the conduct 
forbidden by it is so unclearly defined that persons of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385 (1926) . 
a. The Appellate Court need not ask whether the subject 
statute is unconstitutional on its face because the statute is 
constitutional as applied in this case. To challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute on its face, the Defendant must 
show that it is "invalid in toto -- and therefore incapable of 
any valid application . . . ." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 474 (1974). A statute is ordinarily not unconstitutional on 
its face unless it is vague in all its applications. United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) . However, a court 
need not address hypothetical applications of the law if a 
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plaintiff engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed by 
the statute. It is suggested that the conduct of the Defendant 
in the present case was clearly proscribed by the applicable 
statute. 
Once again, on appeal, the findings of fact and the evidence 
produced at trial --as well as all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, shall be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1205. In so construing the 
facts, it is obvious that the actions of the Defendant in the 
present case constitute conduct that an ordinary person would 
recognize as prohibited by the statute involved. The officer 
testified that the Defendant pulled to within a foot of the back 
of the officer's patrol car as both cars were traveling at a 
speed of approximately 25 miles per hour. The officer testified 
that if he were to break under such circumstances, the defendant 
would not be able to stop his car without colliding into the 
patrol car. The jury found that the distance maintained by the 
defendant in this case was not reasonable and prudent. The jury 
was able to draw this conclusion --as ordinary and reasonable 
people who are familiar with automobiles should, based upon the 
facts produced at trial. It is suggested that under any 
objective, reasonable standard, it is unreasonable and imprudent 
for an automobile to follow another vehicle at a distance of one 
foot while the two vehicles are traveling at a speed of 25 miles 
per hour. Reasonable minds need not guess at the statuteTs 
meaning on this point or differ regarding its application. 
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b. The jury instruction given at trial did not render the 
subject statute unconstitutionally vacrue; nor did it violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. Nonetheless, the Defendant argues 
that the subject statute is rendered vague in the present case 
because a jury instruction allowed the jury to find the defendant 
guilty of Following to Close if they found n[t]hat the distance 
maintained by the defendant between vehicles was not reasonable 
and prudent." The Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-
6-62 was rendered void for vagueness as applied in this case 
because the instruction did not tell the jury that it was 
necessary for them to consider factors such as traffic upon the 
highway and conditions that existed at the time. This argument 
is specious. 
The subject instruction included every element that had to 
be proven to find the Defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
Traffic and road conditions are not elements of the subject 
offense; rather, they are merely factors the jury may consider in 
determining whether the defendant followed officer Roper at a 
distance that was unreasonable and imprudent when, according to 
the officer, the Defendant followed the officer's patrol car at a 
distance of approximately one foot while the two cars were 
traveling at about 25 miles per hour. Given the facts presented 
at trial, the subject jury instruction did now work an injustice 
against the Defendant, and the separation of powers doctrine is 
not implicated since the subject statute included the elements of 
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the crime as outlined by the Utah Legislature.2 
Further, it is suggested that the factors that underscored 
the jury's verdict were the speeds of the two vehicles, the 
distance between the two vehicles and the traffic hazards created 
by the situation caused by the Defendant. The jury heard all of 
the evidence, and they reached a verdict based upon this 
evidence. The Court gave a reasonable instruction that allowed 
the jury to weigh all of the evidence produced at trial --
including the Defendant's claims that were contrary to those of 
Officer Roper's, and the jury found against the defendant. Due 
process has been afforded to this Defendant at every turn; his 
claims to the contrary are without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the Defendant has not raised any issue of 
substance in his appeal. He has twice been convicted of 
following Officer Roper at a distance that was unreasonable and 
imprudent under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-62. This statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague, particularly in light of the facts of 
this case; nor was the statute rendered unconstitutionally vague 
by a jury instruction that merely reflected the elements of the 
crime charged. Finally, there is no separation of powers issue 
in this case, and any contrary contention should be rejected. The 
2It should also be noted, that the separation of powers 
issue is an issue not raised in the justice court, and 
accordingly, it is not appropriate for the defendant to raise the 
issue in this appeal. See, Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d, 
supra. 
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Defendant has been afforded his due process rights, and his 
conviction for Following Too Close should be affirmed. 
DATED THIS 1^ day of ^XdA^ 
r 
Donald G. Lintc 
Logan City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Response of Plaintiff/Appellee to the following: 
David Craig Carlsen 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
DATED THIS J A day of <£\C)Ju^y , 1995 
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